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Austin, Nichols & Co. Inc v Stichting Lodestar 
(Supreme Court of New Zealand, SC 21/2007, 
[2007] NZSC 103, 11 December 2007, Elias CJ, 
Blanchard, Tipping, McGrath and Anderson JJ) 
This Supreme Court decision was an appeal from the Court 
of Appeal decision in Stichting Lodestar v Austin, Nichols & 
Co. Inc..1 The decision clarifies the approach that the High 
Court should take on an appeal against a decision of the 
Commissioner of Trade Marks on registration. 
The case was about the registration of "WILD GEESE" as a 
trade mark. The Assistant Commissioner of Trade Marks 
initially held that Stichting Lodestar could register its "WILD 
GEESE" trade mark and that the mark was not deceptive or 
too similar to Austin, Nichols & Co Inc's "WILD TURKEY" 
trade mark. Austin, Nichols appealed to the High Court, and 
Gendall J allowed the appeal and refused registration. Stichting 
Lodestar successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal which 
granted the applications for registration. Austin, Nichols 
appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court stated the issue as being whether the 
High Court on an appeal under s 27(6) of the Trade Marks 
Act 1953 must defer to the assessment of the Commissioner if 
the conclusion he or she has reached is one on which 
reasonable minds may differ. The Court held that the general 
appeal under s 27(6) required the High Court to come to its 
own view on the merits, and that the weight it should give to 
the decision of the Commissioner was a matter of judgment. If 
the High Court was of the opinion that the Commissioner's 
decision was wrong, it must act on its own view. The Court 
said that the Trade Marks Act 2002 continued to provide a 
right of general appeal from the Commissioner, and the 
correct approach to be taken by the High Court was common 
to the approach required of all appellate courts hearing 
general appeals. 
The Supreme Court went on to discuss the 
well-established principles applicable to general appeals, 
saying that the most familiar general appeals were those 
between Courts. For example the Court of Appeal on general 
appeal from the High Court under s 66 of the Judicature Act 
1908 was entitled to take a different view from the High 
Court. Similar rights of general appeal were provided by 
statute in respect of the decisions of a number of tribunals, 
and the appeal was usually conducted on the basis of the 
record of the Court or tribunal appealed from unless, 
exceptionally, the terms in which the statute providing the 
right of appeal was expressed indicated that a de novo 
hearing of the evidence was envisaged.2 In either case, the 
appellant bore the onus of satisfying the appeal court that it 
should differ from the decision under appeal. It was only if 
the appellate court considered that the appealed decision was 
wrong that it was justified in interfering with it. The Court 
said that the extent of the consideration an appeal court 
exercising a general power of appeal gave to the decision 
appealed from was a matter for its judgment, and an appeal 
court made no error in approach simply because it paid little 
explicit attention to the reasons of the Court or tribunal 
appealed from, if it came to a different reasoned result. On 
general appeal, the appeal court had the responsibility of 
arriving at its own assessment of the merits of the case. 
The Court considered the approach of the Court of Appeal 
in this case, saying that it was not entirely clear that the Court 
of Appeal had meant to depart from these well-established 
principles, although passages in its judgment had given rise 
to doubt. The passages suggested that Gendall J, in allowing 
an appeal from the Commissioner, had given insufficient 
weight to an assessment of the Assistant Commissioner which 
was reasonably open to her. The Court of Appeal applied the 
approach to appellate review it had taken in its decision in 
Federated Farmers of New Zealand Inc v Federated Farmers 
of New Zealand (Northland Province) Inc.3 
The Supreme Court said that the procedure prescribed for 
appeals by s 27 did not provide for full de novo rehearing of 
evidence, and clearly envisaged rehearing on the record.4 The 
appeal court must be persuaded that the decision was wrong, 
but no deference was required beyond the customary caution 
appropriate when seeing the witnesses provides an advan-
tage because credibility is important. The Court of Appeal's 
reliance on Federated Farmers however suggested a wider 
inhibition on appellate scrutiny, as did the apparent reluc-
tance to differ from the tribunal appealed from in a context 
where questions of credibility did not arise. The Supreme 
Court said that in Federated Farmers the Court of Appeal 
was of the opinion that appellate scrutiny ought to be "restrained" 
where a value judgment was entailed, concluding in that case 
that the Registrar's decision was not wrong and "she was 
entitled to decide the way she did". The Supreme Court said 
that seemed to misstate the role of the appellate court on 
general appeal. The Court said that those exercising general 
rights of appeal were entitled to judgment in accordance with 
1. [2007] NZCA 61. 
2. Shotover Gorge Jet Boats Ltd v Jamieson [1987] 1 NZLR 437 was an example. 
3. Court of Appeal, CA 162/05, 19 September 2006, William Young P, O'Regan and Arnold JJ. 
4. Similar to appeals under s 76 of the District Courts Act 1947. 
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the opinion of the appellate court, even where that opinion 
was an assessment of fact and degree and entailed a value 
judgment. If the appellate Court's opinion was different from 
the conclusion of the tribunal appealed from, then the deci-
sion under appeal was wrong in the only sense that mattered, 
even if it was a conclusion on which minds might reasonably 
differ. In such circumstances it was an error for the High 
Court to defer to the lower court's assessment of the accept-
ability and weight to be accorded to the evidence, rather than 
forming its own opinion. 
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal was not 
correct to suggest in this case that the decision turned on a 
value judgment apparently open to the Assistant Commis-
sioner, and that the High Court Judge ought to have consid-
ered and given weight to the Assistant Commissioner's conclusion. 
The Supreme Court said that the High Court Judge was 
obliged to reconsider the issue and was entitled to use the 
reasons of the Assistant Commissioner to assist him in reach-
ing his own conclusion, but the weight he placed on them 
was a matter for him. There was no basis for caution in 
differing from the assessment of the tribunal appealed from. 
The case entailed no question of credibility. It turned on a 
judgment of fact and degree, not the exercise of discretion 
entrusted to the tribunal 
The Supreme Court said however that the Court of Appeal 
overturned the High Court decision not just because the 
High Court had not given sufficient weight or deference to 
the Assistant Commissioner, but also because it formed its 
own assessment that the Assistant Commissioner's decision 
was the correct one. Stichting Lodestar had discharged to the 
satisfaction of the Court of Appeal the onus of showing that 
there was no likelihood of deception or confusion arising out 
of the use of its mark. Had the Court of Appeal not come to 
its own conclusion, the matter would have had to be remitted 
to it. As it was, however, the Court of Appeal had considered 
the merits of the appeal and had come to its own decision. 
There being no ultimate error in approach, the appeal was 
dismissed. 
Neumann v Sons of the Desert, &L. (High 
Court, Auckland CIV 2007-485.212, 12 October 
2007, Courtney J and 5 November 2007, 
Andrews J) 
This was a successful appeal against a decision of the Assis-
tant Commissioner of Trade Marks ("the Assistant Commis-
sioner"), delivered on 15 January 2007, directing that a trade 
mark application for a seated boy device, (a small cartoon 
figure with or without the words "El Nino Tarifa" below it), 
may proceed to registration. The appellant, Mr Neumann, 
had opposed registration on the grounds that the application 
for registration had been made in bad faith. 
On 11 November 2003 the respondent filed an application 
to register the seated boy device trade mark in Classes 16 and 
25. The appellant opposed registration, and the application 
was heard before the Assistant Commissioner on 14 
December 2006. The grounds of opposition were that the 
application for registration was made in bad faith, pursuant 
to s 17(1) (b)(iii) of the Trade Marks Act 2002 (now s 17(2)). 
The allegation of bath faith was based on the appellant's 
evidence that he and two others, a Mr Galdeano and a Mr 
Steffan, had incorporated in September 1998, in Spain, a 
company called Lucky Charm Distribuciones Tarifa S.L. 
("Lucky Charm"). Mr Galdeano was the sole director and 
shareholder of the respondent, Sons of the Desert, S.L. Lucky 
Charm was formed to market casual wear and clothing using 
the El Nino name and the seated boy device. The appellant 
said there was an oral agreement between the three men that 
the trade marks of the business – including the El Nino name 
and the seated boy device – would be jointly owned by all 
three of them, in all countries of the world. 
The Assistant Commissioner held that, although Mr Galdeano's 
knowledge could be imputed to the respondent she had no 
evidence of an agreement between Mr Galdeano and the 
appellant that they would jointly own trade marks consisting 
of the seated boy device, in all countries of the world. The 
appellant's opposition therefore failed. 
The appellant subsequently successfully applied under r 
716 of the High Court Rules to adduce further evidence in 
support of his claim.5 The evidence consisted of affidavits 
and affidavit evidence of translations of documents from 
former shareholders of Lucky Charm. The evidence con-
firmed that there was an oral agreement between the share-
holders of Lucky Charm that trade marks incorporating the 
seated boy device and the name El Nino were owned by them 
in equal shares, in all countries of the world. This evidence 
was not available to the Assistant Commissioner. On 12 
October 2007 Courtney J held that under r 716 of the High 
Court Rules the evidence proposed to be adduced must be 
cogent and likely to be material and could not have been 
discovered at the earlier stage. The Judge held that these 
requirements were satisfied, and granted the application for 
leave to adduce further evidence. 
The appeal was heard by Andrews J and judgment given 
on 5 November 2007. There was no appearance on behalf of 
the respondent at the hearing of the appeal. Andrews J said 
that the appeal was by way of re-hearing, and the Judge was 
required to reach his own conclusion, based on the material 
presented to the Assistant Commissioner, and the further 
evidence adduced by leave. The Judge identified two ques-
tions: 
1. Were the appellant and Mr Galdeano co-owners of the 
trade mark in New Zealand? 
2. If yes, then was the application for registration by the 
respondent made in bad faith? 
On the first question of co-ownership, the judge accepted the 
newly adduced evidence as supporting the appellant's claim 
that he and Mr Galdeano were co-owners of the trade marks 
anywhere in the world, and therefore held that Mr Galdeano 
and the appellant were co-owners of the trade mark for 
which the respondent applied for registration in New Zealand. 
The Judge then considered the second question, whether 
the application was made in bad faith so as to preclude 
registration by s 17(1) (b) (iii). The Assistant Commissioner 
was not required to consider the issue of bad faith. The Judge 
adopted the test in Harrison's Trade Mark Application.6 The 
S. Neumann v Sons of the Desert, S.L. (High Court, Auckland CIV 2007-485-212, 12 October 2007, Courtney J). 
6. [2005] FSR 177, 185. 
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Commissioner (or Court) must decide whether the knowl-
edge of the applicant (a subjective element) was such that its 
decision to apply for registration would be regarded as being in 
had faith by persons adopting proper standards (an objective 
element). The Judge considered whether the respondent's 
application for registration of the trade mark was in bad 
faith, in all the circumstances. The relevant circumstances 
were that Mr Galdea no and the appellant were the co-owners of 
the trade mark by agreement, that Mr Galdeano controlled 
the respondent and his knowledge was imputed to the 
respondent, that the respondent's application for registration 
was made without the knowledge or consent of the appel-
lant, and that registration of the trade mark by the respon-
dent had the effect of depriving the appellant of the benefit of 
registration in New Zealand. The Judge held that in those 
circumstances he was satisfied that the respondent's applica-
tion for registration of the trade mark was conduct that fell 
short of reasonable standards of commercial behaviour. The 
Judge was satisfied that the application was made in had 
faith, and accordingly, pursuant to s 17(1)(b)(iii)/17(2) of the 
Act, the trade mark should not have been accepted for 
registration. The appeal was allowed. 
DB Breweries Ltd v Lion Nathan Ltd 
(High Court, Auckland CIV 
2007404006681, 9 November 2007, 
Harrison J) 
This was a case in which DB alleged passing off and breach of 
the Fair Trading Act by rival Lion Nathan in relation to use 
of "summer ale". 
DB had produced and marketed Summer Ale since 1998. 
In 2007 Lion launched its new product, Mac's Sun Dance 
Summer Ale. DB applied ex parte for an interim injunction, 
alleging that, by displaying the words "Summer Ale" on its 
packaging and labels, Mac's Sun Dance was held out to be 
very similar to Monteith's Summer Ale, and that as a result, 
the distinctiveness and any goodwill attaching to Monteith's 
Summer Ale was likely to be irreparably deleted or harmed. 
The application was heard by Duffy Jon a Pickwick basis on 
31 October 2007. The Judge dismissed it, expressing her 
provisional view that the words "Summer Ale" were gener-
ally descriptive of the style of beer rather than of DB's 
product. Duffy J did not foresee a real risk of confusion or 
misleading so as to cause irreparable damage to Monteith's 
Summer Ale before a defended hearing took place. 
Harrison J heard full arguments and issued this oral 
judgment. DB argued that it had established and owned a 
valuable reputation and goodwill in the words "Summer 
Ale" for beer products; that the phrase was distinctive of and 
synonymous with the company's seasonal goods; and that 
the term meant predominantly its Monteith's Summer Ale. 
Its argument was refined so that it argued that, by using the 
name "Summer Ale" on its labels and on its packaging, Lion 
was appropriating – taking the benefit or advantage of – or 
trading off Monteith's goodwill in the words "Summer Ale". It 
was an argument for the existence of goodwill arising from a 
combination of a brand name and a product description. 
The Judge said that the words "Summer Ale" described the 
goods, and did not originate with DB or Monteith's. 
"Summer Ale" was a generic term applied to a sweet 
refreshing type of beer especially batch brewed for 
summer. It first became popular in the United Kingdom and 
was adopted by Monteith's in 1998. The Judge noted that 
DB had applied to register "Summer Ale" as a trade mark 
but the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand 
(IPONZ) had refused the application on grounds that the 
name was too generic, and there was insufficient evidence 
to show the product had acquired distinctiveness. 
The Judge concluded that a claim for passing off could not 
be sustained solely upon a descriptive or generic term where 
there was no proof of, first, an exclusive or secondary 
reputation and, second, a misrepresentation arising from 
labelling or packaging get-up. The phrase "Summer Ale" did 
not of itself suggest or convey that all summer ale emanated 
from the same source, Monteith's. Instead the name "Monteith's" 
identified the brand; the words "Summer Ale" connoted the 
product.' The Judge said that there was no justification in 
policy or principle for providing DB with what was in effect 
a monopolistic or quasi monopolistic right, equivalent to the 
protection of a trademark, to a descriptive or generic name. 
To the contrary, such a result would be inimical to commer-
cial freedom and competition, and could only ever be rationalised 
if DB was able to show the words "Summer Ale" had 
acquired a secondary meaning, connoting a degree of exclu-
sivity, as denoting its goods. There was no evidential foun-
dation for that argument on the facts.8 
The Judge also said that, even if DB was able to show a 
legal or evidential basis for acquisition of a secondary mean-
ing in the words "Summer Ale", it must still establish a 
foundation for an argument of misrepresentation. Lion's 
get-up and packaging did not misrepresent Mac's Sun Dance 
as Monteith's Summer Ale. All DB could expect the law to 
protect was that Lion distinguish its product by the appro-
priate means, as it had here, in making it clear that its beer 
was produced by Mac's. Lion had actually gone further and, 
in contrast to DB, which sought to incorporate or link its 
Monteith's brand compositely with the generic product descrip-
tion, Lion's product was expressly branded by a combination 
of its Mac's name and the fancy name "Sun Dance". The 
descriptive phrase, Summer Ale, carried much less promi-
nence. The Judge found no basis for saying that DB's prop-
erty in the trade or goodwill of Monteith's product, which 
did not extend to property in the phrase "Summer Ale", 
might possibly be injured by Mac's use of that descriptive 
term. The Judge endorsed Duffy J's initial decision that DB 
has no property in words generally descriptive of a style of 
beer rather than its own product. 
In relation to balance of convenience, the Judge said that 
even if DB had been able to show an arguable case, the merits 
and its relevant weakness would have been decisive at the 
balance of convenience stage. In relation to the adequacy of 
damages the Judge said that it was neutral but, if anything, 
might favour Lion. DB's application was dismissed, and Lion 
was awarded costs. 
7. Citing McCain International Ltd v Country Fair Foods Ltd [1981] RPC 69 (CA), 73-4. 
8. Citing Cellular Clothing Co Ltd v Maxton Murray [1899] AC 326, 329. 
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Intellectual Property Development Corporation 
Pty Ltd v Primary Distributors New Zealand 
Ltd (High Court, Auckland CIV 2006404-4695, 
6 November 2007, J P Doogue AJ) 
In this case the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had 
breached their registered trade marks in respect of wrapping 
products marketed under the name "HEFTY". They alleged 
that the defendants imported into New Zealand and sold 
counterfeit HEFTY brandy products bearing the HEFTY 
registered trade marks, and also products not bearing the 
registered trade marks but sold under and by reference to the 
registered trade marks. 
The defendant filed a notice of interlocutory application 
for further particulars of amended statement of claim. All but 
one issue was resolved in the course of the hearing, and this 
decision related to that matter. The defendants sought par-
ticulars of the facts, matters or circumstances relied on in 
support of the allegation that the alleged conduct "adversely 
affected the plaintiffs' ability to successfully enter the New 
Zealand market with their own HEFTY branded products". 
The plaintiffs argued that the pleading in its present form was 
sufficient, and that the request was really a request for 
evidence. 
The Judge referred to authorities in relation to particulars.9 
The Judge said that legitimate questions could be asked as to 
what connection existed between the allegations of 
infringement and the claimed consequence that the plaintiffs' 
ability to successfully enter the New Zealand market with 
their own HEFTY branded products was adversely affected. 
The particulars sought were not particulars of specific facts 
which would be proved by individual witnesses, nor did they 
go into the question of how much the loss was and the way in 
which the plaintiff calculated it. The particulars sought would 
explain the steps of the reasoning by which the plaintiff 
reached the position where it said that earlier breaches of the 
plaintiffs' registered trademarks made it harder for the plain-
tiff to sell its own products when it started operations in New 
Zealand marketing HEFTY branded products. The Judge 
said that it seemed particulars should be ordered unless there 
was some factor that militated against the fairness of doing 
so, and there was no such factor. The Judge granted the 
application, and the particulars were to be provided within 
15 working days. A standby fixture was allocated in case of 
further problems. 
Inverness Switzerland GMBH v MDS Diagnos-
tics Ltd (High Court, Auckland CIV 2007-404-
748, 1 November 2007, Allan J) 
This was a successful application for joinder of an additional 
defendant in a copyright case. The plaintiff, Inverness Swit-
zerland, claimed to own the copyright in certain drawings 
relating to pregnancy testing devices. It alleged that the 
defendant imported into New Zealand devices that were 
copied, or substantially copied, from the plaintiff's copyright 
works when it knew, or ought to have known, of the exist-
ence of such copyright. 
The plaintiff applied for an order pursuant to r 97(1)(b) 
joining Dr Prakash Appanna, the managing director of the 
existing defendant, MDS Diagnostics, as second defendant. 
The plaintiff argued that Dr Appanna was responsible as a 
director who had allegedly procured or directed the commis-
sion by the defendant of a tort.loAlternatively it argued by 
analogy with the personal liability imposed in Megavitamin 
Laboratories (NZ) v Commerce Commission." The 
defendant argued that in order to succeed at trial the 
plaintiff would need to establish a sufficient assumption of 
responsibility by Dr Appanna to bring the case within the 
principles in Trevor Ivory Ltd v Anderson.12 The defendant 
also argued that the plaintiff would need to show an element 
of deliberate wrongdoing.13 
The Judge said that there was at least an available argu-
ment that Dr Appanna may have "procured or directed" the 
activities of the defendant. The Judge was satisfied that this 
was not one of those rare cases in which a defendant could 
properly ask the Court to decline a plaintiff's application for 
the joinder of the further defendant upon the ground that no 
reasonable cause of action existed against that defendant. 
The Judge ordered that that Prakash Appanna be joined as a 
defendant. 
Finance Now Ltd v Finzsoft Solutions (New 
Zealand) Ltd (High Court, Auckland CIV 2006-
404.4398, 17 September 2007, H Sargisson AJ) 
This case was about a software licence and services agree-
ment relating to a finance industry software product known 
as "Sovereign and Banking Software". The parties entered 
into the agreement on 9 October 2000. In the agreement 
Finzsoft licensed Finance Now to use the software for its 
business as a finance company. Finance Now's claim was 
based on various alleged breaches of the agreement. Finzsoft 
counterclaimed and raised several causes of action based on 
breach of copyright among other things. 
This judgment relates only to an interlocutory application 
by Finzsoft seeking a number of orders including the striking 
out of the statement of claim or summary judgment, and an 
order that the hearing of the counterclaim be split into 
separate hearings on liability and quantum. The Judge reviewed 
each of the orders sought in turn, declining them all. The 
application was therefore disallowed in its entirety. 
9. CC v Qantas Airways (1992) 5 PRNZ 227, Re Securitibank Ltd (No 25) (10 October 1983), HC AK A355-81, Custom 
Technology Systems Limited v Honeywell Limited (AK HC CL 11102, 11 April 2003). 
10. Citing Wah Tat Bank Ltd v Chan Cheng Kum [1975] AC 507, 514-515, C Evans and Sons Ltd v Spritebrand Ltd [1985] 2 
All ER 415, 425, DB Breweries Ltd v The Domain Name Company Ltd HC AK M724/00 15 March 2001. 
11. (1995) 6 TCLR 231. 
12. [1992] 2 NZLR S17. 
13. Citing Winchester International (NZ) Ltd v Cropmark Seeds Ltd CA226/04 5 December 2005; DB Breweries v The 
Domain Company Ltd HC AK M724/00 15 March 2001at [19]. 
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Intellectual Reserve Inc v Robert Sintes (High 
Court, Auckland CIV 2007-404-2610, 
13 December 2007, Winkelmann J) 
This was an appeal from a decision of the Assistant Commis-
sioner of Trade Marks dismissing the plaintiff's opposition to 
registration of the defendant's trade mark. The Trade Marks 
Act 2002 applied. 
The appellant, Intellectual Reserve Inc. was a non-profit 
corporation from Utah, United States and was the owner of 
various trade marks around the world, which it licenced to 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Church). 
It had five New Zealand registered trade marks comprised of 
or containing the text "Familysearch", in relation to a range 
of genealogical services and associated goods. It had two 
word mark registrations for FAMILYSEARCH in classes 16 
and 41. It also had three trade mark registrations in classes 9, 
16, and 42 for the stylised word FAMILYSEARCH. These 
registrations contained a limitation that the registration did 
not give Intellectual Reserve any right to the 'exclusive use, 
separately, of the words "family" and "search".' 
The respondent, Mr Robert Sintes, applied for registra-
tion of a stylised representation of "Familysearch" in rela-
tion to services in class 45 "for the purposes of locating 
missing family including birth parents, adopted children and 
family". Intellectual Reserve opposed the application, assert-
ing that Mr Sintes' trade mark was visually identical, or at 
least very similar to its mark, phonetically identical, concep-
tually identical, and related to identical or similar services. 
The grounds of appeal from the Assistant Commissioner's 
decision dismissing the opposition alleged that the decision 
was erroneous in fact or law because registration of Mr 
Sintes' trade mark was contrary to: 
(i) s 25(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 2002 ("the Act"); 
(ii) s 25(1)(c) of the Act; 
(iii) s 17(1)(a) of the Act; 
(iv) s 17(1)(b) of the Act (in relation to ss 9 and/or 16 of the 
Fair Trading Act/passing off); 
(v) s 18(1)(b) of the Act. 
The Judge said that the appeal Court had the responsibility of 
arriving at its own assessment of the merits of the case when 
determining appeals from the Commissioner.14 
The Judge first considered whether registration was con-
trary to s 25(1) (6) which provided that the Commissioner 
must not register a trade mark in respect of any goods or 
services if: 
... it is similar to a trade mark (trade mark C) that belongs 
to a different owner and that is registered, or has priority 
under section 34 [or section 36], in respect of the same 
goods or services or goods or services that are similar to 
those goods or services, and its use is likely to deceive or 
confuse; 
Intellectual Reserve argued that the Assistant Commissioner 
erred in finding that the respondent's mark was not similar to 
its marks and that its use was not likely to deceive or confuse. 
The Judge found that Mr Sintes' mark was similar to each of 
Intellectual Reserve's word marks as they contained precisely 
the same words, and that it was also similar to the stylised 
marks. The same words were used, they were said the same, 
and the core concept of the marks was such that they were 
clearly similar. In respect of the stylised marks, 
although there were some stylistic differences, such as 
different font, the differences were trivial, and in some ways 
emphasised rather than detracted from the similarity. 
However the Judge found that Mr Sintes' mark was not to 
be registered for the same or similar goods and services as 
Intellectual Reserve's mark, so that there was no need to 
decide whether it was likely to deceive or confuse. 
The Judge then considered whether registration would be 
contrary to s 25(1) (c), which provided that the 
Commissioner must not register a trade mark in respect of 
any goods or services if: 
it is, or an essential element of it is, identical or similar to, 
or a translation of, a trade mark that is well known in 
New Zealand (trade mark D), whether through advertis-
ing or otherwise, in respect of those goods or services or 
similar goods or services or any other goods or services if 
the use of trade mark A would be taken as indicating a 
connection in the course of trade between those other 
goods or services and the owner of trade mark D, and 
would be likely to prejudice the interests of the owner. 
The Assistant Commissioner had found that the evidence 
fell short of meeting the threshold to establish that 
Intellectual Reserve's FAMILYSEARCH trademarks were 
well known. The Judge however accepted the argument that 
it was difficult to reconcile this with her finding that the 
website www.familysearch.org featuring Intellectual 
Reserve's trade marks was well known in New Zealand. 
The Judge had already found that the goods and services 
were not similar goods and services, but s 25(1)(c) extended 
to "any other goods or services". The issue therefore was 
whether the proposed use by Mr Sintes of the mark in 
connection with the personal services he intended offering 
would be taken as indicating a connection in the course of 
trade between Mr Sintes and the Church, and would 
prejudice the interests of Intellectual Reserve. In relation to 
the word marks, the Judge agreed with the Assistant 
Commissioner that even if FAMILYSEARCH was a well 
known mark associated with the Church, if someone were 
to use "family search" or "familysearch" to search the 
internet, they were unlikely to understand or believe that 
every site revealed by the search result was connected to the 
Church. In relation to the stylised marks the Judge was also 
satisfied that the similarity between the stylised marks would 
not be taken as indicating a connection in the course of 
trade, because the Church's and Mr Sintes' services were 
very different and were in different markets. The Judge also 
agreed with the Assistant Commissioner that the fact that 
the services were accessed through the internet meant that 
the inquirer would exercise care in looking for points of 
difference between the sites and the services. The Judge 
upheld the decision of the Assistant Commissioner that 
registration was not prohibited by s 25(1)(c). 
The Judge then considered whether registration was con-
trary to s 17(1)(a), which provided that the 
Commissioner must not register as a trade mark any matter 
"the use of 
14. Citing Austin, Nichols & Co. Inc v Stichting Lodestar (SC21/2007, 11 December 2007); VB Distributors Ltd v 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co Ltd (1999) 9 TCLR 349. 
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which would be likely to deceive or cause confusion". This 
ground of appeal failed on the basis of the Judge's earlier 
findings. 
The Judge then considered the fourth ground of appeal, 
whether registration was contrary to s 17(1)(b) which pro-
vided that the Commissioner must not register as a trade 
mark any matter "the use of which is contrary to New 
Zealand law or would otherwise be disentitled to protection 
in any court". Intellectual Reserve relied on the Fair Trading 
Act and passing off as a basis for the submission that the 
application was not registrable because it was contrary to 
law and disentitled to the protection of the Court. The Judge 
did not consider this ground, for the same reason as the 
Assistant Commissioner, because the s 17(1)(a) ground had 
not been met. A higher threshold of confusion would be 
required to establish passing off or a breach of the Fair 
Trading Act 1986 than was required under s 17(1)(a), and (b) 
had not been satisfied, so that this ground of appeal must fail. 
The Judge then considered the fifth ground of appeal, 
whether registration was contrary to s 18(1)(b) which pro-
vided that the Commissioner must not register a trade mark 
that has no distinctive character. Relevant also was s 18(2) of 
the Act which provided: 
The Commissioner must not refuse to register a trade 
mark under subsection (1)(b), (c), or (d) if, before the date 
of application for registration, as a result of either the use 
made of it or of any other circumstances, the trade mark 
has acquired a distinctive character. 
Intellectual Reserve argued that Mr Sintes' trade mark had a 
very low level of distinctiveness, and that he had not demon-
strated that his application had acquired distinctiveness under 
s 18(2). It also argued that, given that FAMILYSEARCH had 
already acquired a distinctive character attributed solely to 
the Church, Mr Sintes could never demonstrate such acquired 
distinctiveness. The Judge upheld the decision of the Assis-
tant Commissioner who said that if Mr Sintes' mark had only 
consisted of the word combination FAMILYSEARCH, then 
it would not have been capable of distinguishing Mr Sintes' 
services, but it was a combination of words and devices and 
was capable of distinguishing. The Judge said that, in the 
form that the application had been filed, with a graphic 
representation of the words FAMILYSEARCH, it was capable 
of being distinctive of Mr Sintes' services. The Assistant 
Commissioner was correct that the entire mark, which included 
a device, was not a generic expression for these types of 
services. The appeal was dismissed. 
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